EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

To Trust or Not to Trust: Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric N-Player Trust Game

Ik Soo Lim, Naoki Masuda

IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · 2024-02 · 28 (1) · 117-131

DOI: 10.1109/tevc.2023.3244537 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 2024-02. Verfasst von Ik Soo Lim und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 37-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: AFOSR European Office, Japan Science and Technology Agency.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Trusting others and reciprocating the received trust with trustworthy actions are fundaments of economic and social interactions. The trust game (TG) is widely used for studying trust and trustworthiness and entails a sequential interaction between two players, an investor and a trustee. It requires at least two strategies or options for an investor (e.g., to trust versus not to trust a trustee). According to the evolutionary game theory, the antisocial strategies (e.g., not to trust) evolve such that the investor and trustee end up with lower payoffs than those that they would get with the prosocial strategies (e.g., to trust). A generalization of the TG to a multiplayer (i.e., more than two players) TG was recently proposed. However, its outcomes hinge upon two assumptions that various real situations may substantially deviate from: 1) investors are forced to trust trustees and 2) investors can turn into trustees by imitation and vice versa. We propose an asymmetric multiplayer TG that allows investors not to trust and prohibits the imitation between players of different roles; instead, investors learn from other investors and the same for trustees. We show that the evolutionary game dynamics of the proposed TG qualitatively depends on the nonlinearity of the payoff function and the amount of incentives collected from and distributed to players through an institution. We also show that incentives given to trustees can be useful and sufficient to cost-effectively promote trust and trustworthiness among self-interested players.

Förderung

  • AFOSR European Office
  • Japan Science and Technology Agency

Zitieren

APA

Lim, I. S., & Masuda, N. (2024). To Trust or Not to Trust: Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric N-Player Trust Game. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 28(1), 117-131. https://doi.org/10.1109/tevc.2023.3244537

Vancouver

Lim IS, Masuda N. To Trust or Not to Trust: Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric N-Player Trust Game. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation. 2024;28(1):117-131. doi:10.1109/tevc.2023.3244537

BibTeX
@article{Lim2024,
  author = {Lim, Ik Soo and Masuda, Naoki},
  title = {To Trust or Not to Trust: Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric N-Player Trust Game},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {28},
  number = {1},
  pages = {117--131},
  doi = {10.1109/tevc.2023.3244537}
}
Kostenlos starten →