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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Coevolutionary dynamics of collective cooperation and dilemma strength in a collective-risk game

Shijia Hua, Mingquan Xu, Linjie Liu, Xiaojie Chen

Physical Review Research · 24.06.2024 · 6 (2)

DOI: 10.1103/physrevresearch.6.023313 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Physical Review Research, online erschienen am 24.06.2024. Verfasst von Shijia Hua und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 43-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Human behavioral decision-making influences the gaming environment. In turn, changes in the gaming environmental impact individual strategic choices. However, there is scant exploration into how human behavioral decision-making coevolves with dilemma strength. Here, we propose a coevolutionary game model based on collective-risk social dilemma, where an increase in cooperators within the game group reduces the dilemma strength, and vice versa. Upon examining this coupled system, we find that the system is capable of achieving a relatively optimal state, wherein the population sustains a high level of cooperation and the dilemma strength remains at the lowest level. In addition, we have identified the conditions for the emergence of tristability and bistability in the coupled system and numerically validated our theoretical results. Furthermore, we find that the incorporation of institutional rewards not only promotes the appearance of the system's optimal state, where all individuals choose to cooperate and the dilemma strength is at its lowest level, but it also effectively averts the manifestation of the system's worst state, where all individuals resort to defection and the dilemma strength reaches its highest level. These findings illuminate how cooperation can be sustained when a dynamical coupling exists between individual decision-making and dilemma strength. Published by the American Physical Society 2024

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province

Zitieren

APA

Hua, S., Xu, M., Liu, L., & Chen, X. (2024). Coevolutionary dynamics of collective cooperation and dilemma strength in a collective-risk game. Physical Review Research, 6(2). https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevresearch.6.023313

Vancouver

Hua S, Xu M, Liu L, Chen X. Coevolutionary dynamics of collective cooperation and dilemma strength in a collective-risk game. Physical Review Research. 2024;6(2). doi:10.1103/physrevresearch.6.023313

BibTeX
@article{Hua2024,
  author = {Hua, Shijia and Xu, Mingquan and Liu, Linjie and Chen, Xiaojie},
  title = {Coevolutionary dynamics of collective cooperation and dilemma strength in a collective-risk game},
  journal = {Physical Review Research},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  doi = {10.1103/physrevresearch.6.023313}
}
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