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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

Linjie Liu iD, Xiaojie Chen iD, Attila Szolnoki iD

eLife · 19.05.2023 · 12

DOI: 10.7554/elife.82954 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift eLife, online erschienen am 19.05.2023. Verfasst von Linjie Liu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Science, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 114-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 65 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province, National Research, Development and Innovation Office.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals’ behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryHumansFeedbackEcosystemBiological Evolution

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

adaptive feedbackcoevolutionary dynamicscollective-risk social dilemmacomputational biologydecision-makingevolutionary biologygame theorynonesystems biology

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • College of Science, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, China.
  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China.
  • Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Budapest, Hungary.

ORCID-Profile: Linjie Liu, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province
  • National Research, Development and Innovation Office

Zitieren

APA

Liu, L., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2023). Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game. eLife, 12. https://doi.org/10.7554/elife.82954

Vancouver

Liu L, Chen X, Szolnoki A. Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game. eLife. 2023;12. doi:10.7554/elife.82954

BibTeX
@article{Liu2023,
  author = {Liu, Linjie and Chen, Xiaojie and Szolnoki, Attila},
  title = {Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game},
  journal = {eLife},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {12},
  doi = {10.7554/elife.82954}
}
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