Cooperation, satisfaction, and decision uncertainty in social games on complex networks with aspiration-driven players
Physical Review E · 23.09.2025 · 112 (3)
DOI: 10.1103/gljs-6mw4 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Physical Review E, online erschienen am 23.09.2025. Verfasst von M Aguilar-Janita und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Universidad de Extremadura, Departamento de Física, 06006 Badajoz, Spain. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Comunidad de Madrid, Agencia Estatal de Investigación.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A network model based on players' aspirations is proposed and analyzed theoretically and numerically within the framework of evolutionary game theory. In this model, players decide whether to cooperate or defect by comparing their payoffs from pairwise games with their neighbors, driven by a common aspiration level. The model also incorporates a degree of stochasticity, or decision noise, through an effective temperature in the Fermi function. The level of cooperation in the system is fundamentally influenced by two social attributes: satisfaction, defined as the fraction of players whose payoffs exceed the aspiration level, and the degree of noise in decision-making. Deterministic players tend to maintain their initial strategies for sufficiently low aspiration levels, while the presence of noise promotes a state of perfect coexistence, resulting in half of the agents cooperating. The transition between these two behaviors can be critical, often leading to abrupt changes in cooperation levels. When the aspiration level is high, all players become dissatisfied, regardless of the effective temperature. Intermediate levels of aspiration lead to diverse behaviors, including sudden transitions for deterministic agents and a nonmonotonic relationship between cooperation and noise intensity. The study also carefully examines the effects of the interaction structure, initial conditions, and the strategy update rule (asynchronous versus synchronous). Special attention is given to the prisoner's dilemma, where significant cooperation levels can be achieved in a structured environment, with moderate aspiration and low decision noise intensity, and following a synchronous strategy updating scheme.
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Universidad de Extremadura, Departamento de Física, 06006 Badajoz, Spain.
- Universidad de Alcalá, Departamento de Física y Matemáticas & Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, 28805 Alcalá de Henares, Spain.
- Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Complex Systems Group & Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain.
- Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Center for Biomedical Technology, 28223 Pozuelo de Alarcón, Spain.
Förderung
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
- Comunidad de Madrid
- Agencia Estatal de Investigación
- European Regional Development Fund
Zitieren
APA
Aguilar-Janita, M., Khalil, N., Leyva, I., & Sendiña-Nadal, I. (2025). Cooperation, satisfaction, and decision uncertainty in social games on complex networks with aspiration-driven players. Physical Review E, 112(3). https://doi.org/10.1103/gljs-6mw4
Vancouver
Aguilar-Janita M, Khalil N, Leyva I, Sendiña-Nadal I. Cooperation, satisfaction, and decision uncertainty in social games on complex networks with aspiration-driven players. Physical Review E. 2025;112(3). doi:10.1103/gljs-6mw4
BibTeX
@article{AguilarJanita2025,
author = {Aguilar-Janita, M and Khalil, N and Leyva, I and Sendiña-Nadal, I},
title = {Cooperation, satisfaction, and decision uncertainty in social games on complex networks with aspiration-driven players},
journal = {Physical Review E},
year = {2025},
volume = {112},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1103/gljs-6mw4}
}
EUVIMED