EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Security against Trojan-horse attacks on a self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator

Alberto De Toni, Aynur Cemre Aka, Costantino Agnesi, Davide Giacomo Marangon, Giuseppe Vallone, Paolo Villoresi

Physical Review A · 11.05.2026 · 113 (5)

DOI: 10.1103/bgdd-1vl9 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Physical Review A, online erschienen am 11.05.2026. Verfasst von Alberto De Toni und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Università degli Studi di Padova, Horizon 2020, Agenzia Spaziale Italiana.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Quantum key distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to exchange a secret key between two parties. Unlike classical cryptographic systems, the security of QKD is not reliant on computational assumptions but is instead rooted in the fundamental laws of physics. In a QKD protocol, any attempt by an eavesdropper to intercept the key is detectable: this provides an unprecedented level of security, making QKD an attractive solution for secure communication in an era increasingly threatened by the advent of quantum computers and their potential to break classical cryptographic systems. However, QKD also faces several practical challenges such as transmission loss and noise in quantum channels, finite key size effects, and implementation flaws in QKD devices. Addressing these issues is crucial for the large-scale deployment of QKD and the realization of a global quantum Internet. A whole body of research is dedicated to the hacking of the quantum state source, for example using (THAs), where the eavesdropper injects light into the system and analyzes the back-reflected signal. In this paper, we study the vulnerabilities against THAs of the iPOGNAC encoder, first introduced in [M. Avesani , ], to propose adapted countermeasures that can mitigate such attacks.

Förderung

  • Università degli Studi di Padova
  • Horizon 2020
  • Agenzia Spaziale Italiana

Zitieren

APA

Toni, A. D., Aka, A. C., Agnesi, C., Marangon, D. G., Vallone, G., & Villoresi, P. (2026). Security against Trojan-horse attacks on a self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator. Physical Review A, 113(5). https://doi.org/10.1103/bgdd-1vl9

Vancouver

Toni AD, Aka AC, Agnesi C, Marangon DG, Vallone G, Villoresi P. Security against Trojan-horse attacks on a self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator. Physical Review A. 2026;113(5). doi:10.1103/bgdd-1vl9

BibTeX
@article{Toni2026,
  author = {Toni, Alberto De and Aka, Aynur Cemre and Agnesi, Costantino and Marangon, Davide Giacomo and Vallone, Giuseppe and Villoresi, Paolo},
  title = {Security against Trojan-horse attacks on a self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator},
  journal = {Physical Review A},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {113},
  number = {5},
  doi = {10.1103/bgdd-1vl9}
}
Kostenlos starten →