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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Public and private reputation systems for limiting centralized corruption

Zheng Yuan iD, Chen Shen iD, Chen Liu, Matjaž Perc iD, Jinzhuo Liu iD, Zhen Wang iD

Journal of the Royal Society Interface · 04.11.2026 · 23 (244)

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2026.0576 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the Royal Society Interface, online erschienen am 11.11.2026. Verfasst von Zheng Yuan und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Cybersecurity. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Cooperative Behavior, Models, Theoretical. Die Arbeit nennt 62 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Yunnan Province XingDian Talent Support Program, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Corruption is widely recognized as a major challenge in human institutions. To prevent its spread, measures such as increasing transparency have attracted growing attention. Here, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic framework with a reputation mechanism to address centralized corruption and sustain cooperation. In our framework, players participate in a donation game monitored by umpires, who enforce centralized punishment on free riders to support cooperation. However, the possibility of bribery by defectors creates incentives for umpires to abuse their authority, thereby undermining cooperation. To counter this, we construct public and private reputation systems that allow players to condition their participation decisions on the reputations of assigned umpires. Theoretical analysis based on our dynamical model, together with simulations, shows that a public reputation system, in which honest umpires receive good reputations and corrupt ones receive bad reputations, effectively reduces corruption. Interestingly, under certain social norms, private reputation systems can outperform public ones, while also offering an advantage in avoiding higher-order corruption problems inherent in centralized systems. Overall, our results highlight the potential of bottom-up transparency mechanisms in centralized institutions and demonstrate that the effectiveness of reputation systems critically depends on the careful design of social norms.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheoryCooperative BehaviorModels, TheoreticalHumans

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

centralized punishmentcooperationcorruptionevolutionary game theoryreputation systemssocial norms

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Cybersecurity.
  • Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University , Fukuoka, Japan.
  • School of Life Science and Technology, Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi'an, Shaanxi, People's Republic of China.
  • Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor , Maribor, Slovenia.
  • Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor , Maribor, Slovenia.
  • Department of Physics, Kyung Hee University , Seoul, Republic of Korea.

ORCID-Profile: Zheng Yuan, Chen Shen, Matjaž Perc, Jinzhuo Liu, Zhen Wang

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Yunnan Province XingDian Talent Support Program
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
  • Technological Innovation Team of Shaanxi Province
  • International Cooperation Project of Shaanxi Province
  • XPLORER PRIZE 2021 of the Tencent Foundation
  • Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency

Zitieren

APA

Yuan, Z., Shen, C., Liu, C., Perc, M., Liu, J., & Wang, Z. (2026). Public and private reputation systems for limiting centralized corruption. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 23(244). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2026.0576

Vancouver

Yuan Z, Shen C, Liu C, Perc M, Liu J, Wang Z. Public and private reputation systems for limiting centralized corruption. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. 2026;23(244). doi:10.1098/rsif.2026.0576

BibTeX
@article{Yuan2026,
  author = {Yuan, Zheng and Shen, Chen and Liu, Chen and Perc, Matjaž and Liu, Jinzhuo and Wang, Zhen},
  title = {Public and private reputation systems for limiting centralized corruption},
  journal = {Journal of the Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {23},
  number = {244},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2026.0576}
}
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