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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas

Mingquan Xu, Shijia Hua iD, Linjie Liu iD

Journal of the Royal Society Interface · 2026

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2026.0153 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 2026. Verfasst von Mingquan Xu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Punishment, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Models, Theoretical. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Planning Fund of the Ministry of Education.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The question of how to mitigate collective action failure has persistently drawn significant attention from researchers. However, previous theoretical and experimental studies have predominantly assumed a static target, thereby overlooking its inherent dynamic variability. To address this gap, we propose a two-stage three-party collective-risk social dilemma model: in the first stage, punishers sanction defectors; if the first-stage target is achieved, then the collective target is elevated in the second stage to sustain cooperation and mitigate greater risks, whereas failure triggers increased punishment intensity. We find that even in low-risk scenarios, the dynamic target and punishment mechanism can facilitate the emergence of high-level cooperation. Furthermore, moderate target elevation promotes cooperation, while excessive increases trigger cooperation collapse. At high risk, cooperation correlates positively with collective target size. Increasing first-stage punishment intensity within a suitable range boosts cooperation, with the effect more pronounced in low-risk scenarios.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

PunishmentCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryModels, TheoreticalHumansGroup Dynamics

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

collective-risk social dilemmadynamic targetpunishment intensityrepeated group interactions

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, People's Republic of China.

ORCID-Profile: Shijia Hua, Linjie Liu

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
  • Humanities and Social Sciences Research Planning Fund of the Ministry of Education
  • Shaanxi Province Postdoctoral Research Fund

Zitieren

APA

Xu, M., Hua, S., & Liu, L. (2026). Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2026.0153

Vancouver

Xu M, Hua S, Liu L. Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. 2026. doi:10.1098/rsif.2026.0153

BibTeX
@article{Xu2026,
  author = {Xu, Mingquan and Hua, Shijia and Liu, Linjie},
  title = {Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas},
  journal = {Journal of the Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2026.0153}
}
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