Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas
Journal of the Royal Society Interface · 2026
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2026.0153 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 2026. Verfasst von Mingquan Xu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Punishment, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Models, Theoretical. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Planning Fund of the Ministry of Education.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The question of how to mitigate collective action failure has persistently drawn significant attention from researchers. However, previous theoretical and experimental studies have predominantly assumed a static target, thereby overlooking its inherent dynamic variability. To address this gap, we propose a two-stage three-party collective-risk social dilemma model: in the first stage, punishers sanction defectors; if the first-stage target is achieved, then the collective target is elevated in the second stage to sustain cooperation and mitigate greater risks, whereas failure triggers increased punishment intensity. We find that even in low-risk scenarios, the dynamic target and punishment mechanism can facilitate the emergence of high-level cooperation. Furthermore, moderate target elevation promotes cooperation, while excessive increases trigger cooperation collapse. At high risk, cooperation correlates positively with collective target size. Increasing first-stage punishment intensity within a suitable range boosts cooperation, with the effect more pronounced in low-risk scenarios.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, People's Republic of China.
ORCID-Profile: Shijia Hua, Linjie Liu
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
- Humanities and Social Sciences Research Planning Fund of the Ministry of Education
- Shaanxi Province Postdoctoral Research Fund
Zitieren
APA
Xu, M., Hua, S., & Liu, L. (2026). Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2026.0153
Vancouver
Xu M, Hua S, Liu L. Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. 2026. doi:10.1098/rsif.2026.0153
BibTeX
@article{Xu2026,
author = {Xu, Mingquan and Hua, Shijia and Liu, Linjie},
title = {Alleviating collective action failure through dynamic targets and adaptive punishment in collective-risk dilemmas},
journal = {Journal of the Royal Society Interface},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1098/rsif.2026.0153}
}
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