EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation

Alina Glaubitz iD, Feng Fu iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 26.05.2026 · 123 (21)

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2523204123 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 19.05.2026. Verfasst von Alina Glaubitz und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Understanding the origins of volunteerism and free-riding is crucial in collective action situations where a sufficient number of cooperators is necessary to achieve shared benefits, such as in vaccination campaigns and social change movements. Despite the importance of attaining behavioral consistency for successful collective action, the theoretical mechanisms behind this process remain largely elusive. Here, we address this issue by studying the evolutionary dynamics of individual cooperativity levels in multiround threshold public goods games. By using adaptive dynamics, we explore how individual behavior responses are shaped by incentives, with and without reward or punishment. We demonstrate that rewarding consistent cooperators can lead to the emergence of two distinct populations: volunteers who consistently cooperate and free-riders who consistently defect. In contrast, punishing consistent defectors does not lead to similar evolutionary branching. Our results help offer insights into designing effective interventions that promote collective action and address collective risk dilemmas ranging from climate mitigation to pandemic control.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorBiological EvolutionHumansGame TheoryGroup DynamicsSocial Group

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

adaptive dynamicsevolutionary game theoryincentivesthreshold public goods game

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755.
  • Department of Biomedical Data Science, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, Lebanon, NH 03756.

ORCID-Profile: Alina Glaubitz, Feng Fu

Zitieren

APA

Glaubitz, A., & Fu, F. (2026). Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 123(21). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2523204123

Vancouver

Glaubitz A, Fu F. Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2026;123(21). doi:10.1073/pnas.2523204123

BibTeX
@article{Glaubitz2026,
  author = {Glaubitz, Alina and Fu, Feng},
  title = {Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {123},
  number = {21},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2523204123}
}
Kostenlos starten →