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Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by a mixed update rule in structured prisoner’s dilemma games

Longhao Lin iD, Chengrui Li, Xiaojie Chen iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 2025

DOI: 10.1063/5.0245574 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 2025. Verfasst von Longhao Lin und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Prisoner Dilemma, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Sichuan Science and Technology Program.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

How to understand the evolution of cooperation remains a scientific challenge. Individual strategy update rule plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation in a population. Previous works mainly assume that individuals adopt one single update rule during the evolutionary process. Indeed, individuals may adopt a mixed update rule influenced by different preferences such as payoff-driven and conformity-driven factors. It is still unclear how such mixed update rules influence the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation from a theoretical analysis perspective. In this work, in combination with the pairwise comparison rule and the conformity rule, we consider a mixed updating procedure into the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game. We assume that individuals adopt the conformity rule for strategy updating with a certain probability in a structured population. By means of the pair approximation and mean-field approaches, we obtain the dynamical equations for the fraction of cooperators in the population. We prove that under weak selection, there exists one unique interior equilibrium point, which is stable, in the system. Accordingly, cooperators can survive with defectors under the mixed update rule in the structured population. In addition, we find that the stationary fraction of cooperators increases as the conformity strength increases, but is independent of the benefit parameter. Furthermore, we perform numerical calculations and computer simulations to confirm our theoretical predictions.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Prisoner DilemmaCooperative BehaviorBiological EvolutionGame TheoryHumansComputer Simulation

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.

ORCID-Profile: Longhao Lin, Xiaojie Chen

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Sichuan Science and Technology Program

Zitieren

APA

Lin, L., Li, C., & Chen, X. (2025). Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by a mixed update rule in structured prisoner’s dilemma games. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0245574

Vancouver

Lin L, Li C, Chen X. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by a mixed update rule in structured prisoner’s dilemma games. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2025. doi:10.1063/5.0245574

BibTeX
@article{Lin2025,
  author = {Lin, Longhao and Li, Chengrui and Chen, Xiaojie},
  title = {Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by a mixed update rule in structured prisoner’s dilemma games},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0245574}
}
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