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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations

Ming Wei iD, Xin Wang, Longzhao Liu, Hongwei Zheng, Yishen Jiang, Yajing Hao, Zhiming Zheng, Feng Fu iD, Shaoting Tang

Journal of The Royal Society Interface · 2025-04 · 22 (225)

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0827 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of The Royal Society Interface, online erschienen am 02.04.2025. Verfasst von Ming Wei und 8 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, Beihang University, Beijing, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 71 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Beijing Municipality, National Science and Technology Major Project.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the ‘leading-eight’ strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining cooperation. However, in real-world societies, there are widespread interactions at the group level, where individuals need to make a singular action choice when facing multiple individuals with different reputations. Here, through introducing the assessment of collective reputations, we develop a framework that embeds group-level reputation structure into public goods games to study the evolution of group-level indirect reciprocity. We show that changing the criteria of group assessment destabilizes the reputation dynamics of leading-eight strategies. In a particular range of social assessment criteria, all leading-eight strategies can break the social dilemma in public goods games and sustain cooperation. Specifically, there exists an optimal, moderately set assessment criterion that is most conducive to promoting cooperation. Moreover, in the evolution of assessment criteria, the preference of the leading-eight strategies for social strictness is inversely correlated with the payoff level. Our work reveals the impact of social strictness on prosocial behaviour, highlighting the importance of group-level interactions in the analysis of evolutionary games and complex social dynamics.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheoryCooperative BehaviorHumansSocial Behavior

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

collective reputationgame theoryindirect reciprocitysocial norm

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, Beihang University, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • LMIB, NLSDE, Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing, Beihang University, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • School of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • Beijing Academy of Blockchain and Edge Computing, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA.

ORCID-Profile: Ming Wei, Feng Fu

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Natural Science Foundation of Beijing Municipality
  • National Science and Technology Major Project
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities

Zitieren

APA

Wei, M., Wang, X., Liu, L., Zheng, H., Jiang, Y., Hao, Y., Zheng, Z., Fu, F., & Tang, S. (2025). Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 22(225). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2024.0827

Vancouver

Wei M, Wang X, Liu L, Zheng H, Jiang Y, Hao Y, et al. Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations. Journal of The Royal Society Interface. 2025;22(225). doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0827

BibTeX
@article{Wei2025,
  author = {Wei, Ming and Wang, Xin and Liu, Longzhao and Zheng, Hongwei and Jiang, Yishen and Hao, Yajing and Zheng, Zhiming and Fu, Feng and Tang, Shaoting},
  title = {Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations},
  journal = {Journal of The Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {22},
  number = {225},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2024.0827}
}
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