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Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare

The Anh Han iD, Manh Hong Duong iD, Matjaz Perc iD

Journal of The Royal Society Interface · 2024-11 · 21 (220)

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0547 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of The Royal Society Interface, online erschienen am 27.11.2024. Verfasst von The Anh Han und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Computing Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Social Welfare. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 61-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 78 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei in PubMed Central verfügbar.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours among self-interested individuals is an important problem in many scientific disciplines. Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain the evolution of such behaviours, primarily seeking the conditions under which a given mechanism can induce highest levels of cooperation. As these mechanisms usually involve costs that alter individual pay-offs, it is, however, possible that aiming for highest levels of cooperation might be detrimental for social welfare—the latter broadly defined as the total population pay-off, taking into account all costs involved for inducing increased prosocial behaviours. Herein, by comparing stochastic evolutionary models of two well-established mechanisms of prosocial behaviour—namely, peer and institutional incentives—we demonstrate that the objectives of maximizing cooperation and of maximizing social welfare are often misaligned. First, while peer punishment is often more effective than peer reward in promoting cooperation—especially with a higher impact-to-cost ratio—the opposite is true for social welfare. In fact, welfare typically decreases (increases) with this ratio for punishment (reward). Second, for institutional incentives, while maintaining similar levels of cooperation, rewards result in positive social welfare across a much broader range of parameters. Furthermore, both types of incentives often achieve optimal social welfare when their impact is moderate rather than maximal, indicating that careful planning is essential for costly institutional mechanisms to optimize social outcomes. These findings are consistent across varying mutation rates, selection intensities and game configurations. Overall, we argue for the need of adopting social welfare as the main optimization objective when designing and implementing evolutionary mechanisms for social and collective goods.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorBiological EvolutionSocial WelfareHumansPunishment

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

cost efficiencyevolution of cooperationpunishmentrewardsocial dilemmasocial welfare

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Computing Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK.
  • School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
  • Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia.
  • Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia.
  • Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
  • Department of Physics, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Republic of Korea.

ORCID-Profile: The Anh Han, Manh Hong Duong, Matjaz Perc

Zitieren

APA

Han, T. A., Duong, M. H., & Perc, M. (2024). Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 21(220). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2024.0547

Vancouver

Han TA, Duong MH, Perc M. Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare. Journal of The Royal Society Interface. 2024;21(220). doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0547

BibTeX
@article{Han2024,
  author = {Han, The Anh and Duong, Manh Hong and Perc, Matjaz},
  title = {Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare},
  journal = {Journal of The Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {21},
  number = {220},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2024.0547}
}
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