Executive compensation with environmental and social performance
Review of Finance · 01.05.2025 · 29 (3) · 779-818
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 01.03.2025. Verfasst von Pierre Chaigneau und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 82 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
How can managers be incentivized to create both financial and social value? Since managers can anticipate how their decisions impact social performance metrics, they may game a compensation scheme based on these measures. Nevertheless, the optimal compensation contract still incorporates social performance metrics when the board’s preferred level of social investment exceeds the level that maximizes the stock price. In this case, gaming distorts social investments, and the sensitivity of pay to social performance is reduced to mitigate this effect. When multiple independent social performance measures are available, the inefficiencies caused by gaming can be alleviated. Our findings suggest that efforts to harmonize social performance measurement may have unintended negative consequences.
Förderung
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Chaigneau, P., & Sahuguet, N. (2025). Executive compensation with environmental and social performance. Review of Finance, 29(3), 779-818. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf012
Vancouver
Chaigneau P, Sahuguet N. Executive compensation with environmental and social performance. Review of Finance. 2025;29(3):779-818. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf012
BibTeX
@article{Chaigneau2025,
author = {Chaigneau, Pierre and Sahuguet, Nicolas},
title = {Executive compensation with environmental and social performance},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {29},
number = {3},
pages = {779--818},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf012}
}
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