Supervisory cooperation and regulatory arbitrage
Review of Finance · 01.03.2025 · 29 (2) · 381-413
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfae041 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 14.11.2024. Verfasst von Thorsten Beck und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Silva-Buston, ANID Fondecyt Regular, Centro de Gobierno Corporativo de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
While bank supervisors frequently cooperate across countries, novel data on 268 cooperation agreements reveal that such cooperation falls short of covering the global operations of large banking groups. We show that this causes material regulatory arbitrage: banking groups allocate lending activities and risk into third-country subsidiaries when cooperation agreements cover their operations in other countries. The average distortion in a country’s foreign lending caused by regulatory arbitrage is 21 percent, with the effect being magnified in the presence of a weak supervisory framework. Taken together, our results indicate that incompleteness in cooperation substantially diminishes its global effectiveness.
Förderung
- Silva-Buston
- ANID Fondecyt Regular
- Centro de Gobierno Corporativo de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Zitieren
APA
Beck, T., Silva-Buston, C., & Wagner, W. (2025). Supervisory cooperation and regulatory arbitrage. Review of Finance, 29(2), 381-413. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae041
Vancouver
Beck T, Silva-Buston C, Wagner W. Supervisory cooperation and regulatory arbitrage. Review of Finance. 2025;29(2):381-413. doi:10.1093/rof/rfae041
BibTeX
@article{Beck2025,
author = {Beck, Thorsten and Silva-Buston, Consuelo and Wagner, Wolf},
title = {Supervisory cooperation and regulatory arbitrage},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {29},
number = {2},
pages = {381--413},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfae041}
}
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