Green credit and corporate environmental violations: evidence from regulatory arbitrage in China
Frontiers in Climate · 09.10.2025 · 7
DOI: 10.3389/fclim.2025.1643192 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Climate, online erschienen am 09.10.2025. Verfasst von Shuangquan Yang. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Introduction
We test whether identity-based green credit improves or worsens firms' environmental compliance under discretionary enforcement.
Methods
Using a firm-year panel of 2,376 listed firms, we link banks' green-credit status to environmental penalty records and estimate fixed-effects models aided by a shift-share instrument, alongside extensive falsification and robustness checks.
Results
Relative to comparable firms, green-credit recipients are 19.7% more likely to receive environmental penalties, with stronger effects among privately owned firms; greater enforcement standardization attenuates this pattern.
Discussion
Identity-based green credit can backfire under discretionary enforcement; performance-based eligibility and more standardized enforcement can mitigate the risk.
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APA
Yang, S. (2025). Green credit and corporate environmental violations: evidence from regulatory arbitrage in China. Frontiers in Climate, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1643192
Vancouver
Yang S. Green credit and corporate environmental violations: evidence from regulatory arbitrage in China. Frontiers in Climate. 2025;7. doi:10.3389/fclim.2025.1643192
BibTeX
@article{Yang2025,
author = {Yang, Shuangquan},
title = {Green credit and corporate environmental violations: evidence from regulatory arbitrage in China},
journal = {Frontiers in Climate},
year = {2025},
volume = {7},
doi = {10.3389/fclim.2025.1643192}
}
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