A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.08.2024 · 37 (8) · 2355-2402
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhae010 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 05.03.2024. Verfasst von Michael J Fishman und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.
Zitieren
APA
Fishman, M. J., Parker, J. A., & Straub, L. (2024). A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards. The Review of Financial Studies, 37(8), 2355-2402. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae010
Vancouver
Fishman MJ, Parker JA, Straub L. A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards. The Review of Financial Studies. 2024;37(8):2355-2402. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhae010
BibTeX
@article{Fishman2024,
author = {Fishman, Michael J and Parker, Jonathan A and Straub, Ludwig},
title = {A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {37},
number = {8},
pages = {2355--2402},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhae010}
}
EUVIMED