Dynamic Equilibrium with Costly Short-Selling and Lending Market
The Review of Financial Studies · 19.01.2024 · 37 (2) · 444-506
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad060 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 16.08.2023. Verfasst von Adem Atmaz und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 34-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 78 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We develop a dynamic model of costly stock short-selling and lending market and obtain implications that simultaneously support many empirical regularities related to short-selling. In our model, investors’ belief disagreement leads to shorting demand, whereby short-sellers pay shorting fees to borrow stocks from lenders. Our main novel results are as follows. Short interest is positively related to shorting fee and predicts stock returns negatively. Higher short-selling risk can be associated with lower stock returns and less short-selling activity. Stock volatility is increased under costly short-selling. An application to GameStop episode yields implications consistent with observed patterns.
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APA
Atmaz, A., Basak, S., & Ruan, F. (2024). Dynamic Equilibrium with Costly Short-Selling and Lending Market. The Review of Financial Studies, 37(2), 444-506. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad060
Vancouver
Atmaz A, Basak S, Ruan F. Dynamic Equilibrium with Costly Short-Selling and Lending Market. The Review of Financial Studies. 2024;37(2):444-506. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad060
BibTeX
@article{Atmaz2024,
author = {Atmaz, Adem and Basak, Suleyman and Ruan, Fangcheng},
title = {Dynamic Equilibrium with Costly Short-Selling and Lending Market},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {37},
number = {2},
pages = {444--506},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhad060}
}
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