Designing Securities for Scrutiny
The Review of Financial Studies · 21.08.2023 · 36 (9) · 3693-3737
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad013 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 10.02.2023. Verfasst von Brendan Daley und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: European Research Council, European Union’s Horizon 2020, Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigate the effect of scrutiny (e.g., credit ratings, analyst reports, or mandatory disclosures) on the security design problem of a privately informed issuer. We show that scrutiny has important implications for both the form of security designed and the amount of inefficient retention of cash flows. The model predicts that issuers will design informationally sensitive securities (i.e., levered equity) when scrutiny is sufficiently intense. Otherwise, issuers opt for a standard debt contract. Scrutiny increases efficiency by decreasing issuers’ reliance on retention to signal quality and, perhaps counterintuitively, decrease price informativeness.
Förderung
- European Research Council
- European Union’s Horizon 2020
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Zitieren
APA
Daley, B., Green, B., & Vanasco, V. (2023). Designing Securities for Scrutiny. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(9), 3693-3737. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad013
Vancouver
Daley B, Green B, Vanasco V. Designing Securities for Scrutiny. The Review of Financial Studies. 2023;36(9):3693-3737. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad013
BibTeX
@article{Daley2023,
author = {Daley, Brendan and Green, Brett and Vanasco, Victoria},
title = {Designing Securities for Scrutiny},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {36},
number = {9},
pages = {3693--3737},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhad013}
}
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