Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 01.02.2026 · 15 (1) · 227-268
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfae022 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 10.10.2024. Verfasst von Attila Balogh und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An unprecedented number of firms announced CEO salary reductions at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. We document that the total compensation for these CEOs did not actually decrease but was instead restructured, leading to a marked increase in opaque components of compensation. These adjustments align with the managerial power view of executive pay setting, whereby heightened stakeholder outrage prompts greater camouflaging of compensation to avoid scrutiny. We further show that this pattern of compensation adjustments predominantly occurred in firms with powerful CEOs, weak institutional investor monitoring, and poorer governance quality.
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APA
Balogh, A., Wright, D., & Zein, J. (2026). Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 15(1), 227-268. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfae022
Vancouver
Balogh A, Wright D, Zein J. Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2026;15(1):227-268. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfae022
BibTeX
@article{Balogh2026,
author = {Balogh, Attila and Wright, Danika and Zein, Jason},
title = {Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?},
journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {1},
pages = {227--268},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfae022}
}
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