Macroeconomic Implications of Executive Pay Caps
Journal of the European Economic Association · 05.10.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvag061 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 05.10.2026. Verfasst von Francesco Caselli. Die Arbeit nennt 16 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: CFM, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I study the introduction of statutory caps on executive pay ratios (pay caps) in a span-of-control economy with heterogeneous managerial talent. Managers hire fewer workers than they would in the absence of pay caps, and the marginal product of labour is not equalized among firms. The ability of the marginal manager declines. Inequality between managers and workers, and among managers, declines, but inequality among workers increases. Quantitatively, overall inequality decreases substantially, especially via a reduction in top income shares, but the GDP losses are also significant. In addition, the redistribution favours the “middle” deciles between 50 and 90, rather than the bottom 50% of the income distribution. Future work will build on this “first pass” to analyse the effect of pay caps in economies distorted by monopsony power, non-pecuniary benefits of control, and managerial rent extraction.
Förderung
- CFM
- Centre for Economic Policy Research
Zitieren
APA
Caselli, F. (2026). Macroeconomic Implications of Executive Pay Caps. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag061
Vancouver
Caselli F. Macroeconomic Implications of Executive Pay Caps. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2026. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvag061
BibTeX
@article{Caselli2026,
author = {Caselli, Francesco},
title = {Macroeconomic Implications of Executive Pay Caps},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvag061}
}
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