A complete classification of evolutionary games with environmental feedback
PNAS Nexus · 30.10.2024 · 3 (11)
DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae455 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PNAS Nexus, online erschienen am 10.10.2024. Verfasst von Hiromu Ito und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of International Health and Medical Anthropology, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki 852-8523, Japan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 26-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI, NIG-JOINT, Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A tragedy of the commons, in which rational behavior of individuals to maximize their own payoffs depletes common resources, is one of the most important research topics in game theory. To better understand the social dilemma problem, recent studies have developed a theoretical framework of feedback-evolving game where individual behavior affects an environmental (renewable) resource and the environmental resource changes individual payoffs. While previous studies assumed that the frequency of defectors increases (prisoner's dilemma [PD] game) when the environmental resource is abundant to investigate an oscillating tragedy of the commons, it is also possible for other types of game to produce the social dilemma. In this paper, we extend the feedback-evolving game by considering not only PD game, but also the other three game structures when the environmental resource is replete for a reasonably complete classification. The three games are Chicken game where defectors and cooperators coexist through minority advantage, Stag-Hunt (SH) game with minority disadvantage, and Trivial game where the frequency of cooperators increases. In addition, we utilize a dilemma phase plane to visually track (transient) dynamics of game structure changes. We found that an emergent initial condition dependence (i.e. bistability) is pervasive in the feedback-evolving game when the three games are involved. We also showed that persistent oscillation dynamics arise even with Chicken or SH games in replete environments. Our generalized analysis will be an important step to further extend the theoretical framework of feedback-evolving game to various game situations with environmental feedback.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of International Health and Medical Anthropology, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki 852-8523, Japan.
- Center for Frontier Research, National Institute of Genetics, 1111 Yata, Mishima, Shizuoka 411-8540, Japan.
- Genetics Program, Graduate Institute for Advanced Studies, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), 1111 Yata, Mishima, Shizuoka 411-8540, Japan.
- School of the Environment, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia.
- Institute for Multidisciplinary Sciences, Yokohama National University, 79-5 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya, Yokohama, Kanagawa 240-8501, Japan.
- Department of Ecosystem Studies, Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 1-1-1 Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8657, Japan.
ORCID-Profile: Hiromu Ito, Masato Yamamichi
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI
- NIG-JOINT
- Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project
Zitieren
APA
Ito, H., & Yamamichi, M. (2024). A complete classification of evolutionary games with environmental feedback. PNAS Nexus, 3(11). https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae455
Vancouver
Ito H, Yamamichi M. A complete classification of evolutionary games with environmental feedback. PNAS Nexus. 2024;3(11). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae455
BibTeX
@article{Ito2024,
author = {Ito, Hiromu and Yamamichi, Masato},
title = {A complete classification of evolutionary games with environmental feedback},
journal = {PNAS Nexus},
year = {2024},
volume = {3},
number = {11},
doi = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae455}
}
EUVIMED