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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Environmental capacity feedback reshapes eco-evolutionary game dynamics

Soumen Majhi iD, Matjaž Perc iD, Dibakar Ghosh iD

PNAS Nexus · 30.10.2026 · 5 (11)

DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag358 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PNAS Nexus, online erschienen am 17.11.2026. Verfasst von Soumen Majhi und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Physics Department, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via della Ricerca Scientifica 1, Rome 00133, Italy. Die Arbeit nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Environmental conditions often change on timescales similar to evolutionary dynamics, yet classical game-theoretic models typically assume fixed payoffs that ignore such ecological feedbacks. Here, we introduce an eco-evolutionary game framework in which the payoffs to cooperators and defectors are directly shaped by the fraction of free space, the unoccupied environmental capacity that determines opportunities for growth, colonization, and resource renewal. In our model, free space evolves in response to population composition and, in turn, modifies strategic incentives by altering the payoffs of cooperators and defectors in proportion to available free space. Using a combination of analytical techniques and numerical simulations, we characterize all equilibrium states and derive explicit feasibility and stability conditions under free-space feedback. We show that this ecological capacity coupling fundamentally reorganizes evolutionary outcomes. Free-space feedback can prevent strategy extinction, stabilize coexistence in parameter regimes where classical models predict collapse, and generate persistent oscillations through supercritical Hopf bifurcations. These oscillations often correspond to endogenous cyclic dominance among cooperators, defectors, and the free-space component, an emergent behavior impossible under static payoffs. Our results demonstrate a minimal mechanism by which simple ecological constraints can produce rich eco-evolutionary dynamics, including recovery from collapse and long-term coexistence. By embedding environmental capacity directly into the payoff structure, this framework offers a tractable approach for understanding how resource availability and spatial opportunity regulate cooperation in ecological communities, microbial populations, and social–ecological systems.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

cooperationcyclic dominanceenvironment-mediated payoffsevolutionary game theorysocial dilemma

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Physics Department, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via della Ricerca Scientifica 1, Rome 00133, Italy.
  • Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, Maribor 2000, Slovenia.
  • Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor, Ulica talcev 9, Maribor 2000, Slovenia.
  • Department of Physics, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 02447, Republic of Korea.
  • University College, Korea University, 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul 02841, Republic of Korea.
  • Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B. T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India.

ORCID-Profile: Soumen Majhi, Matjaž Perc, Dibakar Ghosh

Förderung

  • Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency

Zitieren

APA

Majhi, S., Perc, M., & Ghosh, D. (2026). Environmental capacity feedback reshapes eco-evolutionary game dynamics. PNAS Nexus, 5(11). https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag358

Vancouver

Majhi S, Perc M, Ghosh D. Environmental capacity feedback reshapes eco-evolutionary game dynamics. PNAS Nexus. 2026;5(11). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag358

BibTeX
@article{Majhi2026,
  author = {Majhi, Soumen and Perc, Matjaž and Ghosh, Dibakar},
  title = {Environmental capacity feedback reshapes eco-evolutionary game dynamics},
  journal = {PNAS Nexus},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {5},
  number = {11},
  doi = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag358}
}
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