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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization

Setayesh Radkani iD, Marika Landau-Wells iD, Rebecca Saxe iD

PNAS Nexus · 01.10.2024 · 3 (10)

DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae393 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PNAS Nexus, online erschienen am 15.10.2024. Verfasst von Setayesh Radkani und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 86 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Patrick J. McGovern Foundation, Guggenheim Foundation.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In polarized societies, divided subgroups of people have different perspectives on a range of topics. Aiming to reduce polarization, authorities may use debunking to lend support to one perspective over another. Debunking by authorities gives all observers shared information, which could reduce disagreement. In practice, however, debunking may have no effect or could even contribute to further polarization of beliefs. We developed a cognitively inspired model of observers’ rational inferences from an authority’s debunking. After observing each debunking attempt, simulated observers simultaneously update their beliefs about the perspective underlying the debunked claims and about the authority’s motives, using an intuitive causal model of the authority’s decision-making process. We varied the observers’ prior beliefs and uncertainty systematically. Simulations generated a range of outcomes, from belief convergence (less common) to persistent divergence (more common). In many simulations, observers who initially held shared beliefs about the authority later acquired polarized beliefs about the authority’s biases and commitment to truth. These polarized beliefs constrained the authority’s influence on new topics, making it possible for belief polarization to spread. We discuss the implications of the model with respect to beliefs about elections.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Bayesian inferencecredibilityinverse planningmisinformationpolarization

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
  • Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94705, USA.
  • McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.

ORCID-Profile: Setayesh Radkani, Marika Landau-Wells, Rebecca Saxe

Förderung

  • Patrick J. McGovern Foundation
  • Guggenheim Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Radkani, S., Landau-Wells, M., & Saxe, R. (2024). How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization. PNAS Nexus, 3(10). https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae393

Vancouver

Radkani S, Landau-Wells M, Saxe R. How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization. PNAS Nexus. 2024;3(10). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae393

BibTeX
@article{Radkani2024,
  author = {Radkani, Setayesh and Landau-Wells, Marika and Saxe, Rebecca},
  title = {How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization},
  journal = {PNAS Nexus},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {3},
  number = {10},
  doi = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae393}
}
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