Can Rational Reflection Save Moral Knowledge from Debunking?
Episteme · 2024-12 · 21 (4) · 1418-1433
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.37 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 29.06.2023. Verfasst von Noah McKay. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this essay, I reply to an influential objection to evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism. According to this objection, our capacity for autonomous rational reflection allows us to grasp moral truths independently of distorting evolutionary influences, so those influences do not prevent us from having moral knowledge. I argue that rational moral reflection is not, in fact, autonomous from evolutionary influences, since it depends on our evolved, pre-reflective grasp of moral properties. I then consider and reject the suggestion that realists can supply an autonomous foundation for rational moral reflection or do without any such foundation. Next, I address the allegation that my arguments have skeptical implications for rational reflection in non-moral domains. Finally, I conclude with a gesture toward a more promising route for realists who oppose debunking arguments.
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APA
McKay, N. (2024). Can Rational Reflection Save Moral Knowledge from Debunking?. Episteme, 21(4), 1418-1433. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.37
Vancouver
McKay N. Can Rational Reflection Save Moral Knowledge from Debunking?. Episteme. 2024;21(4):1418-1433. doi:10.1017/epi.2023.37
BibTeX
@article{McKay2024,
author = {McKay, Noah},
title = {Can Rational Reflection Save Moral Knowledge from Debunking?},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2024},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1418--1433},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2023.37}
}
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