Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos
The Economic Journal · 29.01.2024 · 134 (658) · 785-810
DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead082 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 03.10.2023. Verfasst von Caroline Le Pennec. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Politicians seeking to persuade voters may not always be able to say what they would like to say. Adopting policy positions opposite to that of their party or contradicting their previous policy announcements may be costly. I use computational text analysis on 30,000 candidate manifestos from two-round French elections to show that politicians take these costs into account, by toeing the party line and sticking to their platform, while also strategically adjusting their campaign communication and advertising neutral non-policy issues when they need to reach a broader electorate. I provide suggestive evidence that this moderation of electoral discourse predicts better performance in office and may therefore provide valuable information to voters.
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APA
Pennec, C. L. (2024). Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos. The Economic Journal, 134(658), 785-810. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead082
Vancouver
Pennec CL. Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos. The Economic Journal. 2024;134(658):785-810. doi:10.1093/ej/uead082
BibTeX
@article{Pennec2024,
author = {Pennec, Caroline Le},
title = {Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2024},
volume = {134},
number = {658},
pages = {785--810},
doi = {10.1093/ej/uead082}
}
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