Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication
The Journal of Finance · 2025-06 · 80 (3) · 1815-1869
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13453 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 10.04.2025. Verfasst von DAN LUO. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An entrepreneur makes offers to multiple investors to fund a project that requires a minimum investment. Concerned about other investors' decisions, each investor strategically communicates information about the project to others. When investors have conflicts of interest, those with contractually stronger incentives to invest attempt to persuade others to invest. Depending on the project's ex ante quality, the entrepreneur may promise investors different returns to create conflicts of interest and induce persuasion, or may promise investors an identical return to align their interests and induce truthful communication. The paper illustrates a new motivation for syndication and hierarchy within syndicates.
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APA
LUO, D. (2025). Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication. The Journal of Finance, 80(3), 1815-1869. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13453
Vancouver
LUO D. Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(3):1815-1869. doi:10.1111/jofi.13453
BibTeX
@article{LUO2025,
author = {LUO, DAN},
title = {Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {3},
pages = {1815--1869},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13453}
}
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