The shackles of foreknowledge
Analysis · 27.08.2026 · 86 (3) · 577-584
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaf037 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analysis, online erschienen am 19.11.2025. Verfasst von Ryan Wasserman. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 14 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many incompatibilists have claimed that divine foreknowledge would rob us of the ability to do otherwise, even though that knowledge would not itself play any role in producing our behaviour (either in the actual world or in counterfactual situations where we try to do otherwise). Some philosophers have rejected this position on the grounds that it would require a mysterious non-causal constraint on ability. I argue that this worry is overstated, and I suggest a new way for the incompatibilist to understand the supposed shackles of foreknowledge.
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APA
Wasserman, R. (2026). The shackles of foreknowledge. Analysis, 86(3), 577-584. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf037
Vancouver
Wasserman R. The shackles of foreknowledge. Analysis. 2026;86(3):577-584. doi:10.1093/analys/anaf037
BibTeX
@article{Wasserman2026,
author = {Wasserman, Ryan},
title = {The shackles of foreknowledge},
journal = {Analysis},
year = {2026},
volume = {86},
number = {3},
pages = {577--584},
doi = {10.1093/analys/anaf037}
}
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