Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and Constitutive Constraints
Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56
DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10124 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 03.11.2026. Verfasst von Ryan Wasserman. Die Arbeit nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Some time travelers would appear subject to invisible forces that limit their capacities in surprising ways. This article develops a new account of this phenomenon by connecting it to a long-standing issue in the philosophy of religion. More specifically, I consider a traditional worry for certain incompatibilists about freedom and foreknowledge, and I argue that a parallel problem arises for anyone who believes that time travelers are limited in ways that ordinary people are not. This analogy helps to clarify one of the central puzzles about time travel, while also pointing toward a novel solution.
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APA
Wasserman, R. (2026). Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and Constitutive Constraints. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10124
Vancouver
Wasserman R. Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and Constitutive Constraints. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10124
BibTeX
@article{Wasserman2026,
author = {Wasserman, Ryan},
title = {Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and Constitutive Constraints},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {56},
doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10124}
}
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