What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics · 2026-08-07
DOI: 10.1086/743545 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, published online on 2026-08-07. Written by Josue Ortega and 3 co-authors. 83 references.
Abstract (original language)
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we show that these mechanisms cannot correct DA's rank-inefficiency and inequality, because these shortcomings can arise even in cases where DA is Pareto-efficient. We also examine students' segregation in settings with advantaged and marginalized students. We prove that the demographic composition of every school is perfectly preserved under any Pareto-efficient mechanism that dominates DA, and consequently fully segregated schools under DA maintain their extreme homogeneity.
Cite
APA
Ortega, J., Ziegler, G., Arribillaga, R. P., & Zhao, G. (2026). What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics. https://doi.org/10.1086/743545
Vancouver
Ortega J, Ziegler G, Arribillaga RP, Zhao G. What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics. 2026. doi:10.1086/743545
BibTeX
@article{Ortega2026,
author = {Ortega, Josue and Ziegler, Gabriel and Arribillaga, R. Pablo and Zhao, Geng},
title = {What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1086/743545}
}
EUVIMED