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What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix

Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga, Geng Zhao

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics · 2026-08-07

DOI: 10.1086/743545 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, published online on 2026-08-07. Written by Josue Ortega and 3 co-authors. 83 references.

ResumoDados bibliográficosCiteRelated studies

Abstract (original language)

The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we show that these mechanisms cannot correct DA's rank-inefficiency and inequality, because these shortcomings can arise even in cases where DA is Pareto-efficient. We also examine students' segregation in settings with advantaged and marginalized students. We prove that the demographic composition of every school is perfectly preserved under any Pareto-efficient mechanism that dominates DA, and consequently fully segregated schools under DA maintain their extreme homogeneity.

Cite

APA

Ortega, J., Ziegler, G., Arribillaga, R. P., & Zhao, G. (2026). What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics. https://doi.org/10.1086/743545

Vancouver

Ortega J, Ziegler G, Arribillaga RP, Zhao G. What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics. 2026. doi:10.1086/743545

BibTeX
@article{Ortega2026,
  author = {Ortega, Josue and Ziegler, Gabriel and Arribillaga, R. Pablo and Zhao, Geng},
  title = {What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1086/743545}
}
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