Counterpossibles in Relative Computability Theory: A Deeper Look
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · 2026-03-11
DOI: 10.1086/741304 ↗At a glance
Journal article in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, published online on 2026-03-11. Written by Matteo Plebani and 2 co-authors. 12 references.
Abstract (original language)
A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Jenny has argued that relative computability theory provides examples of false counterpossibles. If Jenny were right, this would be highly significant, since it would follow that the standard analysis of counterfac-tuals, according to which counterpossibles are all vacuously true, is incorrect. In this paper, we argue against the claim that computability theory provides examples of false counterpossibles. We distinguish two ways of reading the alleged false counterpossibles. Under the first reading, they are indeed false but, as we argue, they are not genuine counterpossibles. Under the second reading, they are genuine counterpossibles, but they are true. There is a way to interpret the alleged false counterpossibles as false, and there is a way to interpret them as counterpossibles, but under neither of these two interpretations are they false counterpossibles
Cite
APA
Plebani, M., Mauro, L. F. S., & Lenta, G. (2026). Counterpossibles in Relative Computability Theory: A Deeper Look. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/741304
Vancouver
Plebani M, Mauro LFS, Lenta G. Counterpossibles in Relative Computability Theory: A Deeper Look. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2026. doi:10.1086/741304
BibTeX
@article{Plebani2026,
author = {Plebani, Matteo and Mauro, Luca Francesco San and Lenta, Giorgio},
title = {Counterpossibles in Relative Computability Theory: A Deeper Look},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1086/741304}
}
EUVIMED