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Against Self-Location

Emily Adlam

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · 2024-08-28

DOI: 10.1086/732908 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, published online on 2024-08-28. Written by Emily Adlam. Cited 4 times so far (Crossref); 22 references.

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Abstract (original language)

I distinguish between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences, and argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I first argue that from a practical point of view, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I then use considerations motivated by Bertrand's paradox to argue that the indifference principle and other popular constraints on self-locating credences fail to be a priori principles of epistemic rationality, and I critique some approaches to deriving self-locating credences based on analogies to non-self-locating cases. Finally, I consider the implications of this conclusion for various applications of self-locating probabilities in scientific contexts, arguing that it may undermine certain kinds of reasoning about multiverses, the simulation hypothesis, and Boltzmann brains.

Cite

APA

Adlam, E. (2024). Against Self-Location. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/732908

Vancouver

Adlam E. Against Self-Location. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2024. doi:10.1086/732908

BibTeX
@article{Adlam2024,
  author = {Adlam, Emily},
  title = {Against Self-Location},
  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1086/732908}
}
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