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Persuasion for the Long Run

James Best, Daniel Quigley

Journal of Political Economy · 2024-05-01 · 132 (5) · 1740-1791

DOI: 10.1086/727282 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Journal of Political Economy, published on 2024-05-01. Written by James Best and 1 co-authors. Cited 28 times so far (Crossref); 57 references.

AbstractBibliografiske oplysningerCiteRelated studies

Abstract (original language)

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment—even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk—including Bayesian persuasion—can be supported without cost.

Cite

APA

Best, J., & Quigley, D. (2024). Persuasion for the Long Run. Journal of Political Economy, 132(5), 1740-1791. https://doi.org/10.1086/727282

Vancouver

Best J, Quigley D. Persuasion for the Long Run. Journal of Political Economy. 2024;132(5):1740-1791. doi:10.1086/727282

BibTeX
@article{Best2024,
  author = {Best, James and Quigley, Daniel},
  title = {Persuasion for the Long Run},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {132},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1740--1791},
  doi = {10.1086/727282}
}
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