Persuasion for the Long Run
Journal of Political Economy · 2024-05-01 · 132 (5) · 1740-1791
DOI: 10.1086/727282 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Journal of Political Economy, published on 2024-05-01. Written by James Best and 1 co-authors. Cited 28 times so far (Crossref); 57 references.
Abstract (original language)
We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment—even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk—including Bayesian persuasion—can be supported without cost.
Cite
APA
Best, J., & Quigley, D. (2024). Persuasion for the Long Run. Journal of Political Economy, 132(5), 1740-1791. https://doi.org/10.1086/727282
Vancouver
Best J, Quigley D. Persuasion for the Long Run. Journal of Political Economy. 2024;132(5):1740-1791. doi:10.1086/727282
BibTeX
@article{Best2024,
author = {Best, James and Quigley, Daniel},
title = {Persuasion for the Long Run},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2024},
volume = {132},
number = {5},
pages = {1740--1791},
doi = {10.1086/727282}
}
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