The Wages of Repression
The Journal of Politics · 2024-07-01 · 86 (3) · 850-863
DOI: 10.1086/726950 ↗At a glance
Journal article in The Journal of Politics, published on 2024-07-01. Written by Jessica S. Sun. Cited 7 times so far (Crossref); 79 references.
Abstract (original language)
Autocrats use preventive repression to deter opposition mobilization. I show that repression can be more intense and arbitrary under constraints that prevent the use of other policy tools, like patronage. Building on a conceptual distinction between targeted repression (against regime opponents) and indiscriminate repression (against civilians broadly), my framework demonstrates that autocrats may benefit from using both types of repression together to deter opposition to the regime. Targeted and indiscriminate repression have distinct effects on civilians’ incentives to support an opposition. Targeted repression reduces benefits of challenging the regime, activating civilians’ security concerns. Indiscriminate repression affects individuals’ material well-being, leading to a net improvement in economic opportunities. These participation and material well-being mechanisms make targeted and indiscriminate repression jointly optimal for the autocrat. Further, targeted and indiscriminate repression may be complements, meaning the regime prevents the emergence of opposition groups most effectively by employing more of both types of repression simultaneously.
Cite
APA
Sun, J. S. (2024). The Wages of Repression. The Journal of Politics, 86(3), 850-863. https://doi.org/10.1086/726950
Vancouver
Sun JS. The Wages of Repression. The Journal of Politics. 2024;86(3):850-863. doi:10.1086/726950
BibTeX
@article{Sun2024,
author = {Sun, Jessica S.},
title = {The Wages of Repression},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
year = {2024},
volume = {86},
number = {3},
pages = {850--863},
doi = {10.1086/726950}
}
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