Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market
Journal of Political Economy · 2024-03-01 · 132 (3) · 723-771
DOI: 10.1086/726906 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Journal of Political Economy, published on 2024-03-01. Written by Stephanie Assad and 3 co-authors. Cited 157 times so far (Crossref); 79 references.
Abstract (original language)
We provide the first empirical analysis of the relationship between algorithmic pricing (AP) and competition by studying the impact of adoption in Germany’s retail gasoline market, where software became widely available in 2017. Because adoption dates are unknown, we identify adopting stations by testing for structural breaks in AP markers, finding most breaks to be around the time of widespread AP introduction. Because station adoption is endogenous, we instrument using headquarter adoption. Adoption increases margins but only for nonmonopoly stations. In duopoly and triopoly markets, margins increase only if all stations adopt, suggesting that AP has a significant effect on competition.
Cite
APA
Assad, S., Clark, R., Ershov, D., & Xu, L. (2024). Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market. Journal of Political Economy, 132(3), 723-771. https://doi.org/10.1086/726906
Vancouver
Assad S, Clark R, Ershov D, Xu L. Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market. Journal of Political Economy. 2024;132(3):723-771. doi:10.1086/726906
BibTeX
@article{Assad2024,
author = {Assad, Stephanie and Clark, Robert and Ershov, Daniel and Xu, Lei},
title = {Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2024},
volume = {132},
number = {3},
pages = {723--771},
doi = {10.1086/726906}
}
EUVIMED