The Specialness of Zero
The Journal of Law and Economics · 2022-02-01 · 65 (1) · 157-176
DOI: 10.1086/714971 ↗At a glance
Journal article in The Journal of Law and Economics, published on 2022-02-01. Written by Joshua S. Gans. Cited 9 times so far (Crossref); 17 references.
Abstract (original language)
A model is provided whereby a monopolist firm chooses to price its product at 0. This outcome is shown to be driven by the assumption of free disposal alongside selection markets (where prices impact a firm’s costs). Free disposal creates a mass point of consumers whose utility from the product is 0. When costs are negative, the paper shows that a zero-price equilibrium can emerge. The paper shows that this outcome can be socially optimal and that, while a move from monopoly to competition can result in a negative price equilibrium, this can be welfare reducing. The conclusion is that 0 can be a special zone with respect to policy analysis such as in antitrust.
Cite
APA
Gans, J. S. (2022). The Specialness of Zero. The Journal of Law and Economics, 65(1), 157-176. https://doi.org/10.1086/714971
Vancouver
Gans JS. The Specialness of Zero. The Journal of Law and Economics. 2022;65(1):157-176. doi:10.1086/714971
BibTeX
@article{Gans2022,
author = {Gans, Joshua S.},
title = {The Specialness of Zero},
journal = {The Journal of Law and Economics},
year = {2022},
volume = {65},
number = {1},
pages = {157--176},
doi = {10.1086/714971}
}
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