Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance
Ethics · 2020-10-01 · 131 (1) · 87-106
DOI: 10.1086/709140 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Ethics, published on 2020-10-01. Written by Jacob M. Nebel. Cited 20 times so far (Crossref); 19 references.
Abstract (original language)
Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk-averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of rational individuals and choices that guarantee worse distributions. These results, I suggest, undermine Buchak’s argument for rank-weighted utilitarianism.
Cite
APA
Nebel, J. M. (2020). Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance. Ethics, 131(1), 87-106. https://doi.org/10.1086/709140
Vancouver
Nebel JM. Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance. Ethics. 2020;131(1):87-106. doi:10.1086/709140
BibTeX
@article{Nebel2020,
author = {Nebel, Jacob M.},
title = {Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance},
journal = {Ethics},
year = {2020},
volume = {131},
number = {1},
pages = {87--106},
doi = {10.1086/709140}
}
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