Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions
The Journal of Legal Studies · 2015-01 · 44 (S1) · S7-S33
DOI: 10.1086/676007 ↗At a glance
Journal article in The Journal of Legal Studies, 2015-01. Written by Pedro Bordalo and 2 co-authors. Cited 77 times so far (Crossref); 22 references.
Abstract (original language)
We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge’s attention. By focusing judicial attention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can affect judicial decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence that bears on the psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring effects in the setting of damages, decoy effects in choice of legal remedies, and framing effects in the decision to litigate. The model also offers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.
Cite
APA
Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2015). Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions. The Journal of Legal Studies, 44(S1), S7-S33. https://doi.org/10.1086/676007
Vancouver
Bordalo P, Gennaioli N, Shleifer A. Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions. The Journal of Legal Studies. 2015;44(S1):S7-S33. doi:10.1086/676007
BibTeX
@article{Bordalo2015,
author = {Bordalo, Pedro and Gennaioli, Nicola and Shleifer, Andrei},
title = {Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions},
journal = {The Journal of Legal Studies},
year = {2015},
volume = {44},
number = {S1},
pages = {S7--S33},
doi = {10.1086/676007}
}
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