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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Indirect reciprocity with dual private assessment

Yukari Jessica Tham, Christian Hilbe iD, Yohsuke Murase iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 01.09.2026 · 123 (35)

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2624656123 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 27.08.2026. Verfasst von Yukari Jessica Tham und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe University, Kobe 657-8501, Japan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), EC | European Research Council (ERC), MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

People often cooperate out of concern for their reputation. The corresponding theory of indirect reciprocity predicts that such cooperation can only evolve if people’s opinions of each other are sufficiently correlated. This correlation, however, can be difficult to achieve when individuals form their opinions independently from one another, as in private assessment models. In that case, errors can generate disagreements that propagate throughout a population. Here, we identify a simple mechanism that mitigates this problem. Most prior work assumes that observers revise only the reputations of donors—the individuals who choose whether to cooperate or defect. We instead allow observers to also revise the reputations of recipients—the individuals affected by the donors’ choices. Using analytical calculations and simulations, we show that such dual reputation updates help synchronize opinions and facilitate cooperation. To demonstrate this approach, we focus on a particularly simple rule, which we call Recipient Image Scoring (RIS). Under RIS, recipients are assessed as good whenever donors choose to cooperate with them. We show that this rule for judging recipients effectively complements the classical leading-eight rules for judging donors. Our results establish dual assessment as a simple mechanism for cooperation that relies only on directly observable information.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

evolution of cooperationevolutionary game theoryindirect reciprocitysocial norms

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe University, Kobe 657-8501, Japan.
  • Interdisciplinary Transformation University, Linz 4040, Austria.
  • RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Science, Wako 351-0198, Japan.
  • RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe 650-0047, Japan.
  • Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Saitama University, Saitama 338-8570, Japan.

ORCID-Profile: Christian Hilbe, Yohsuke Murase

Förderung

  • Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
  • EC | European Research Council (ERC)
  • MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)
  • MEXT | RIKEN ()

Zitieren

APA

Tham, Y. J., Hilbe, C., & Murase, Y. (2026). Indirect reciprocity with dual private assessment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 123(35). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2624656123

Vancouver

Tham YJ, Hilbe C, Murase Y. Indirect reciprocity with dual private assessment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2026;123(35). doi:10.1073/pnas.2624656123

BibTeX
@article{Tham2026,
  author = {Tham, Yukari Jessica and Hilbe, Christian and Murase, Yohsuke},
  title = {Indirect reciprocity with dual private assessment},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {123},
  number = {35},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2624656123}
}
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