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Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and zero-trust institutional enforcement in Prisoner’s Dilemma games

Shengxian Wang iD, Chengyu Yin iD, Darong Huang iD, Xiaojie Chen iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 01.03.2026 · 36 (3)

DOI: 10.1063/5.0324288 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, online erschienen am 23.03.2026. Verfasst von Shengxian Wang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Computer and Information (School of Artificial Intelligence), Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241002, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Prisoner Dilemma, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Trust. Die Arbeit nennt 68 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Institutional punishment is widely used to promote cooperation, yet most existing studies assume that institutions can perfectly identify individual strategies. Under this idealized assumption, cooperators are typically trusted and exempt from monitoring, while sanctions are imposed exclusively on known defectors, thereby neglecting the informational imperfections inherent in real-world governance. To address these limitations, we adopt the zero-trust principle of “never trust, always verify” and develop a zero-trust institutional framework, in which all individuals are subject to uniform monitoring, and sanctions are applied only upon the actual detection of defection. Given that institutional enforcement intensity in practice is rarely static, we further introduce enforcement intensity as an endogenous variable into the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and construct a coevolutionary model in which the enforcement intensity and population state are mutually coupled through a closed feedback loop; that is, higher cooperation levels drive the growth of enforcement, while prevalence of defection leads to institutional relaxation. Under fixed and adaptive enforcement intensities, our theoretical and numerical results reveal distinct evolutionary outcomes characterized by different stable equilibria. Finally, by devising the institutional cost functions, we demonstrate that under fixed enforcement, zero-trust punishment outperforms non-zero-trust one in terms of long-run cost-efficiency at intermediate levels of enforcement. Under adaptive zero-trust enforcement, increasing enforcement responsiveness to population state reduces long-run costs when enforcement itself is relatively inexpensive, albeit with diminishing marginal returns, whereas excessive responsiveness increases overall governance costs when enforcement is expensive.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Prisoner DilemmaCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryTrustHumansComputer SimulationModels, Theoretical

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Computer and Information (School of Artificial Intelligence), Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241002, China.
  • School of Artificial Intelligence, Anhui University, Hefei 230601, China.
  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.

ORCID-Profile: Shengxian Wang, Chengyu Yin, Darong Huang, Xiaojie Chen

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Wang, S., Yin, C., Huang, D., & Chen, X. (2026). Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and zero-trust institutional enforcement in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 36(3). https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0324288

Vancouver

Wang S, Yin C, Huang D, Chen X. Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and zero-trust institutional enforcement in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2026;36(3). doi:10.1063/5.0324288

BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
  author = {Wang, Shengxian and Yin, Chengyu and Huang, Darong and Chen, Xiaojie},
  title = {Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and zero-trust institutional enforcement in Prisoner’s Dilemma games},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {36},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0324288}
}
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