Impact of trajectory-dependent reputation dynamics on the spatial public goods game
Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 01.01.2026 · 36 (1)
DOI: 10.1063/5.0308950 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, online erschienen am 08.01.2026. Verfasst von Xingping Sun und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650000, Yunnan, China. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In exploring the evolution of social cooperation, reputation mechanisms play a crucial role. To construct a model that more closely reflects reality, this paper proposes a reputation dynamics model based on multidimensional states and designs a dual-channel update rule that combines reputation and payoff. This framework enables players’ decisions to no longer depend solely on short-term payoffs but to comprehensively evaluate richer, dynamic social reputation signals. This significantly enhances the competitiveness of cooperators in the public goods game dilemma and provides a possibility for their long-term survival. We find that the effect of the reputation mechanism on cooperative behavior is not a monotonic linear pattern. Although increasing the weight of reputation almost always systematically promotes cooperation, the designed reputation system (defined by the intensity of rewards and punishments and the strictness of social norms) is a double-edged sword. Whether increasing the punishment intensity alone or enhancing the strictness of norms, exceeding a critical point can trigger the negative effect of excessive punishment. That is, a severe punishment originally intended to promote cooperation can, when its intensity is too high, systematically destroy the cooperative order, leading to a “cooperation suppression regime.” This paper profoundly clarifies the importance of avoiding excessive punishment and maintaining system resilience in reputation design, providing new insights into the evolution of cooperation in complex social systems.
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650000, Yunnan, China.
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Yunnan University, Kunming 650000, Yunnan, China.
ORCID-Profile: Xinlong Zhang, Hongwei Kang, Yong Shen
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Sun, X., Zhang, X., Kang, H., Shen, Y., Chen, Q., & Zhang, Y. (2026). Impact of trajectory-dependent reputation dynamics on the spatial public goods game. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 36(1). https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0308950
Vancouver
Sun X, Zhang X, Kang H, Shen Y, Chen Q, Zhang Y. Impact of trajectory-dependent reputation dynamics on the spatial public goods game. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2026;36(1). doi:10.1063/5.0308950
BibTeX
@article{Sun2026,
author = {Sun, Xingping and Zhang, Xinlong and Kang, Hongwei and Shen, Yong and Chen, Qingyi and Zhang, Yan},
title = {Impact of trajectory-dependent reputation dynamics on the spatial public goods game},
journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {36},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1063/5.0308950}
}
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