EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Choices without preferences: Principles of rational arbitrariness.

Shlomi Sher iD, Johannes Müller-Trede iD, Craig R M McKenzie

Psychological Review · 2025

DOI: 10.1037/rev0000529 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Psychological Review, 2025. Verfasst von Shlomi Sher und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Psychological Science, Pomona College. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Choice Behavior, Models, Psychological, Decision Making, Psychological Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: James S. McDonnell Foundation, National Science Foundation, Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Traditional models of rational choice assume that preferences are complete, but the completeness axiom is neither normatively compelling nor psychologically plausible. Building on recent work in economics, we develop a rational analysis of decision making with incomplete preferences. The analysis sheds surprising light on a range of well-known behavioral "anomalies," including the endowment effect, status quo maintenance, the sunk cost effect, and coherent arbitrariness. We propose a two-part division of rational choice theory-into preference theory and "implementation theory"-and show how conservative and coherently arbitrary policies can effectively implement incomplete preferences. The two-part normative framework motivates a psychological distinction between evaluation and implementation phases in decision making. We argue that the endowment effect and related phenomena, which have usually been attributed to loss aversion in the evaluation phase, are better explained by conservatism in the implementation phase. The rational analysis challenges the normative adequacy of expected utility theory and raises questions about the explanatory scope of prospect theory. It illustrates the rich interplay between psychological models of value structure and normative models of rational choice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Choice BehaviorModels, PsychologicalDecision MakingPsychological TheoryHumans

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Psychological Science, Pomona College.
  • IESE Business School, University of Navarra.
  • Rady School of Management, University of California San Diego.

ORCID-Profile: Shlomi Sher, Johannes Müller-Trede

Förderung

  • James S. McDonnell Foundation
  • National Science Foundation
  • Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation

Zitieren

APA

Sher, S., Müller-Trede, J., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2025). Choices without preferences: Principles of rational arbitrariness. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000529

Vancouver

Sher S, Müller-Trede J, McKenzie CRM. Choices without preferences: Principles of rational arbitrariness. Psychological Review. 2025. doi:10.1037/rev0000529

BibTeX
@article{Sher2025,
  author = {Sher, Shlomi and Müller-Trede, Johannes and McKenzie, Craig R M},
  title = {Choices without preferences: Principles of rational arbitrariness},
  journal = {Psychological Review},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1037/rev0000529}
}
Kostenlos starten →