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Why moral judgements change across variations of trolley‐like problems

Dale J Cohen, Philip T Quinlan iD

British Journal of Psychology · 2025

DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12782 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift British Journal of Psychology, 2025. Verfasst von Dale J Cohen und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington, North Carolina, USA. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Judgment, Morals, Decision Making. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei in PubMed Central verfügbar.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In the standard ‘trolley problem’, respondents must decide whether to save a condemned group of individuals by sacrificing a safe bystander. Although respondents often are willing to sacrifice the bystander in some circumstances (e.g., by pulling a lever), they are loath to sacrifice the bystander in others (e.g., by pushing the bystander off a footbridge). This difference in responding has been explained via a Dual Process theory of moral judgements (DPT). DPT, however, is a classic boxes‐and‐arrows model that only makes directional predictions. Meehl (1967, Philosophy of Science , 34, 103) cautioned against theories that only make directional predictions, explaining that they are notoriously difficult to falsify. Meehl (1967, Philosophy of Science , 34, 103) argued that researchers should follow the lead of Physics and develop computational models that make functional and point predictions. Here, we use a value‐based, computational cognitive model of decision‐making (Psychological Value Theory) to predict precisely both the speed and kind of response in trolley‐like problems in three experiments. We show that this model accounts for the changes in choices across variations of the trolley problem with a response bias parameter.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

JudgmentMoralsDecision MakingHumansModels, PsychologicalAdultFemaleMaleYoung AdultEthical DilemmasPsychological Theory

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Dual Process TheoryPsychological Values Theorycomputational modellingsacrificial moral dilemmastrolley problems

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington, North Carolina, USA.
  • Department of Psychology, University of York, Heslington, York, UK.

ORCID-Profile: Philip T Quinlan

Zitieren

APA

Cohen, D. J., & Quinlan, P. T. (2025). Why moral judgements change across variations of trolley‐like problems. British Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12782

Vancouver

Cohen DJ, Quinlan PT. Why moral judgements change across variations of trolley‐like problems. British Journal of Psychology. 2025. doi:10.1111/bjop.12782

BibTeX
@article{Cohen2025,
  author = {Cohen, Dale J and Quinlan, Philip T},
  title = {Why moral judgements change across variations of trolley‐like problems},
  journal = {British Journal of Psychology},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1111/bjop.12782}
}
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