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Social preferences under the shadow of the future

Felix Kölle, Simone Quercia, Egon Tripodi

Experimental Economics · 2025-01 · 28 (1) · 22-42

DOI: 10.1017/eec.2024.11 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 14.04.2025. Verfasst von Felix Kölle und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 87 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Social interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions.

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APA

Kölle, F., Quercia, S., & Tripodi, E. (2025). Social preferences under the shadow of the future. Experimental Economics, 28(1), 22-42. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2024.11

Vancouver

Kölle F, Quercia S, Tripodi E. Social preferences under the shadow of the future. Experimental Economics. 2025;28(1):22-42. doi:10.1017/eec.2024.11

BibTeX
@article{Klle2025,
  author = {Kölle, Felix and Quercia, Simone and Tripodi, Egon},
  title = {Social preferences under the shadow of the future},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {28},
  number = {1},
  pages = {22--42},
  doi = {10.1017/eec.2024.11}
}
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