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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Thomas Daske, Christoph March

Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 19 (3) · 975-999

DOI: 10.3982/te5335 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2024. Verfasst von Thomas Daske und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We explore mechanism design with outcome‐based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi‐linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex post budget‐balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive‐compatible, interim individually rational, and ex post Pareto‐efficient.

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APA

Daske, T., & March, C. (2024). Efficient incentives with social preferences. Theoretical Economics, 19(3), 975-999. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5335

Vancouver

Daske T, March C. Efficient incentives with social preferences. Theoretical Economics. 2024;19(3):975-999. doi:10.3982/te5335

BibTeX
@article{Daske2024,
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  title = {Efficient incentives with social preferences},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {19},
  number = {3},
  pages = {975--999},
  doi = {10.3982/te5335}
}
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