Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism
Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2025-05 · 55 (4) · 387-404
DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10059 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 30.03.2026. Verfasst von Haicheng Zhao. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Social Science Fund of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Proponents of modal knowledge accounts (safety and sensitivity) concur that one crucial advantage of their accounts is that they solve the so-called lottery problem—the problem of explaining why “lottery beliefs” based merely on statistical evidence do not constitute knowledge. Contra this claim, I argue that epistemic judgments about lottery beliefs do not consistently track what occurs in a specified set of nonactual possibilities. Thus, modal knowledge accounts cannot properly explain beliefs based merely on statistical evidence. Finally, I argue that these beliefs can be better accommodated by a rival theory of modal accounts—namely, explanationism.
Förderung
- National Social Science Fund of China
Zitieren
APA
Zhao, H. (2025). Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 55(4), 387-404. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10059
Vancouver
Zhao H. Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2025;55(4):387-404. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10059
BibTeX
@article{Zhao2025,
author = {Zhao, Haicheng},
title = {Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {55},
number = {4},
pages = {387--404},
doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10059}
}
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