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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism

Haicheng Zhao

Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2025-05 · 55 (4) · 387-404

DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10059 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 30.03.2026. Verfasst von Haicheng Zhao. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Social Science Fund of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Proponents of modal knowledge accounts (safety and sensitivity) concur that one crucial advantage of their accounts is that they solve the so-called lottery problem—the problem of explaining why “lottery beliefs” based merely on statistical evidence do not constitute knowledge. Contra this claim, I argue that epistemic judgments about lottery beliefs do not consistently track what occurs in a specified set of nonactual possibilities. Thus, modal knowledge accounts cannot properly explain beliefs based merely on statistical evidence. Finally, I argue that these beliefs can be better accommodated by a rival theory of modal accounts—namely, explanationism.

Förderung

  • National Social Science Fund of China

Zitieren

APA

Zhao, H. (2025). Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 55(4), 387-404. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10059

Vancouver

Zhao H. Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2025;55(4):387-404. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10059

BibTeX
@article{Zhao2025,
  author = {Zhao, Haicheng},
  title = {Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {55},
  number = {4},
  pages = {387--404},
  doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10059}
}
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