A Modal Explanationist Solution to the Gettier Problem
Episteme · 04.11.2026 · 1-14
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2026.10165 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 04.11.2026. Verfasst von Ying Zhang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Gettier problem suggests that the core challenge for theories of knowledge lies in eliminating knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. In response, two major approaches have emerged in contemporary epistemology: modalism and explanationism. However, both approaches have limitations and exhibit an interesting theoretical symmetry: while modalism effectively handles environmental luck, it struggles with certain cases of intervening luck; explanationism faces the reverse difficulty. This symmetrical limitation suggests that any theory of knowledge relying on a single dimension is likely to be inadequate. To address this, this paper presents a new, integrated approach – Modal Explanationism (ME). ME requires that a belief counts as knowledge just in case it is explained by the truth of the believed proposition in the actual world, and that this explanatory connection is preserved across a range of nearby possible worlds. It is argued that ME offers a more successful solution to the Gettier problem than either modalism or explanationism alone.
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APA
Zhang, Y., & Zhao, H. (2026). A Modal Explanationist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Episteme, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10165
Vancouver
Zhang Y, Zhao H. A Modal Explanationist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Episteme. 2026:1-14. doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10165
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
author = {Zhang, Ying and Zhao, Haicheng},
title = {A Modal Explanationist Solution to the Gettier Problem},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--14},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2026.10165}
}
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