Open Access · CC BY 4.0
The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions
Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 235 · 106192
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106192 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Theory, 2026-06. Verfasst von Lawrence M. Ausubel und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Research University Higher School of Economics.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- National Research University Higher School of Economics
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APA
Ausubel, L. M., & Baranov, O. (2026). The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 235, 106192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106192
Vancouver
Ausubel LM, Baranov O. The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;235:106192. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2026.106192
BibTeX
@article{Ausubel2026,
author = {Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Baranov, Oleg},
title = {The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {235},
pages = {106192},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2026.106192}
}
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