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Crossref

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design

Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes

Operations Research · 2025-05 · 73 (3) · 1659-1674

DOI: 10.1287/opre.2022.0428 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Operations Research, 2025-05. Verfasst von Jerry Anunrojwong und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Market designers often only have partial information about the environment and prefer simple mechanisms that are robust to the underlying uncertainty. In “On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design,” Anunrojwong, Balseiro, and Besbes study the fundamental problem of selling an item to n buyers, when only an upper bound on values is known and the seller minimizes worst-case regret. They establish that the same mechanism is robustly optimal across a wide range of environments for distributions of values: i.i.d., mixtures of i.i.d., exchangeable, and affiliated (the last two capturing positive dependence). Moreover, this robust mechanism is a second-price auction with random reserve price depending on n. Without positive dependence, the problem reduces to the one-buyer case. This result supports the wide use of second-price auctions in practice and allows them to quantify the robust value of competition in auctions.

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APA

Anunrojwong, J., Balseiro, S. R., & Besbes, O. (2025). On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design. Operations Research, 73(3), 1659-1674. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.0428

Vancouver

Anunrojwong J, Balseiro SR, Besbes O. On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design. Operations Research. 2025;73(3):1659-1674. doi:10.1287/opre.2022.0428

BibTeX
@article{Anunrojwong2025,
  author = {Anunrojwong, Jerry and Balseiro, Santiago R. and Besbes, Omar},
  title = {On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design},
  journal = {Operations Research},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {73},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1659--1674},
  doi = {10.1287/opre.2022.0428}
}
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