Feedback and continuous-time cheap talk in minimum effort game: An experimental study
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review · 2026-04 · 23 (1) · 145-165
DOI: 10.1007/s40844-026-00356-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, online erschienen am 05.07.2026. Verfasst von Hisashi Toku und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 12 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
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APA
Toku, H., Shichijo, T., & Ogawa, K. (2026). Feedback and continuous-time cheap talk in minimum effort game: An experimental study. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 23(1), 145-165. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-026-00356-3
Vancouver
Toku H, Shichijo T, Ogawa K. Feedback and continuous-time cheap talk in minimum effort game: An experimental study. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review. 2026;23(1):145-165. doi:10.1007/s40844-026-00356-3
BibTeX
@article{Toku2026,
author = {Toku, Hisashi and Shichijo, Tatsuhiro and Ogawa, Kazuhito},
title = {Feedback and continuous-time cheap talk in minimum effort game: An experimental study},
journal = {Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {23},
number = {1},
pages = {145--165},
doi = {10.1007/s40844-026-00356-3}
}
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