Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game
Games · 02.06.2023 · 14 (3) · 47
DOI: 10.3390/g14030047 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 02.06.2023. Verfasst von Chirantan Ganguly und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford–Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.
Zitieren
APA
Ganguly, C., & Ray, I. (2023). Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game. Games, 14(3), 47. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030047
Vancouver
Ganguly C, Ray I. Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game. Games. 2023;14(3):47. doi:10.3390/g14030047
BibTeX
@article{Ganguly2023,
author = {Ganguly, Chirantan and Ray, Indrajit},
title = {Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game},
journal = {Games},
year = {2023},
volume = {14},
number = {3},
pages = {47},
doi = {10.3390/g14030047}
}
EUVIMED