Experimental results on the roommate problem
Social Choice and Welfare · 23.06.2026
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-026-01667-5 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Choice and Welfare, online erschienen am 23.06.2026. Verfasst von Elena Molis und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with most theoretical models, as their offering and accepting decisions are mainly guided by the objective of improving upon the status quo. In consequence, markets move towards satisfying blocking pairs making the number of remaining blocking pairs diminish and the aggregate payoffs increase over time. Overall, the theoretical solutions of absorbing sets and stable matchings to the roommate problem are supported by the experimental results. However, not all matchings in an absorbing set have the same power of attraction in the experimental laboratory. The theoretical property of P-stability refines absorbing sets as predictors of final outcomes.
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APA
Molis, E., & Veszteg, R. F. (2026). Experimental results on the roommate problem. Social Choice and Welfare. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01667-5
Vancouver
Molis E, Veszteg RF. Experimental results on the roommate problem. Social Choice and Welfare. 2026. doi:10.1007/s00355-026-01667-5
BibTeX
@article{Molis2026,
author = {Molis, Elena and Veszteg, Róbert F.},
title = {Experimental results on the roommate problem},
journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s00355-026-01667-5}
}
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